Defense Perspectives on Fairness and Efficiency at the International Criminal Court by Turner, Jenia I.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940483 
1 
 
Defense Perspectives on Fairness and Efficiency at the International Criminal Court 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner1 




I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 2 
II. The Rise of Managerial Judging at International Criminal Courts ...................................... 4 
III. Defense Views on Fairness and Efficiency at the ICC ...................................................... 7 
A. Survey Method ..................................................................................................................... 7 
B. Survey Findings.................................................................................................................... 8 
1. Judicial Managerialism ........................................................................................................ 9 
2. Defense Investigative Resources ..................................................................................... 12 
3. Prosecutorial Disclosure ................................................................................................... 18 
4. Confirmation of Charges .................................................................................................. 22 
5. Interlocutory Appeals ....................................................................................................... 26 
6. Victim Participation .......................................................................................................... 28 
7. Institutional Support for the Defense ............................................................................ 30 
8. Procedural Consistency .................................................................................................... 32 
IV. The Future of Managerial Judging and Procedural Fairness at the ICC ....................... 33 
 
  
                                                 
1 Amy Abboud Ware Centennial Professor in Criminal Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank the survey 
participants for sharing their observations with me and to Esteban Peralta Losilla and the Counsel Support 
Section at the ICC for agreeing to distribute the survey on my behalf. Thanks also go to Meg deGuzman, 
Megan Fairlie, Ken Gallant, Chris Jenks, Stephen Smith Cody, and participants in the University of Oslo 
PluriCourts conference on “Strengthening the Validity of International Criminal Tribunals,” the 2016 Annual 
Meeting of the Southeast Association of Law Schools, and the 2016 ASIL International Criminal Law Interest 
Group Workshop for their comments. Finally, I am grateful to the SMU Law Faculty Excellence Fund for 
supporting the research for this chapter. 





Over the last several years, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has come under 
increasing pressure to expedite its proceedings and do more with fewer resources.2 The 
Assembly of States Parties has created special working groups to examine how to streamline 
the criminal process, and judges at the court have responded with their own study of the 
same question.3 The notion that the Court’s proceedings are too lengthy and not properly 
managed is broadly shared among ICC observers, participants, and stakeholders.4 
Efficiency is an important goal for international criminal courts, for a number of 
reasons. It ensures defendants’ right to a speedy trial, promotes victims’ interest in closure, 
conserves limited resources, and helps provide justice in as many cases as possible with the 
resources available. Yet an unrelenting pursuit of efficiency can interfere with other values of 
the international criminal process, such as the protection of individual rights and the search 
for truth.5 This tradeoff was observed at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Under pressure by donors to speed up proceedings and cut costs in the 
2000s, ICTY judges introduced various “managerial” reforms, which limited oral evidence in 
favor of written statements, restricted the parties’ time for examining witnesses, discouraged 
interlocutory appeals, and failed to provide sufficient time and resources for defense 
investigations.6 Scholars and even some ICTY judges found that these procedural reforms at 
times gave undue priority to judicial economy over fairness, equality of arms, and a thorough 
exploration of the facts.7 
                                                 
2 See Sergey Vasiliev, The Structure and Management of International Criminal Trials’ (Guest Lecture, ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 26 March 2015). 
3 See, eg, ‘ASP 14: How can ICC trials be more efficient?’ (Coalition for the ICC, 24 November 2015, 
<https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/asp14-how-can-icc-trials-be-more-efficient.> [accessed 
3 November 2016]. 
4 See Guénaël Mettraux et al., Expert Initiative Report on Promoting Effectiveness at the International 
Criminal Court (2014) 83 (Expert Initiative Report); Håkan Friman, ‘Trial Procedures—With a Particular Focus 
on the Relationship Between the Proceedings of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The 
Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 909, 915-31; John Jackson and Yassin M’Boge, 
‘The Effect of Legal Culture on the Development of International Evidentiary Practice: From the “Robing 
Room” to the “Melting Pot”’ (2013) 26 Leiden J Intl L 947, 965; War Crimes Research Office, Expediting 
Proceedings at the International Criminal Court (2011) 33 (WCRO Expediting Proceedings Report). 
5 Vasiliev (n 2) 18. 
6 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, ‘The Dichotomy Between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms Within 
International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense Perspective’ (2005) 28 Fordham Intl LJ 1566, 
1589; Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, (2004) 53 Am J Comp L 
835, 874; Vasiliev (n 2) 18; Richard Vogler, ‘Making International Criminal Procedure Work: From Theory to 
Practice,’ in Ralph J. Henham and Mark Findlay (eds), Exploring the Boundaries of International Criminal Justice 
(Ashgate 2011)105, 110; see also Maximo Langer and Joseph W. Doherty, ‘Managerial Judging Goes 
International, But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled’ (2011) 36 Yale J Intl L 241, 260 (finding that the managerial 
reforms instituted at the ICTY increased rather than decreased the length of proceedings). For the application 
of managerialism to the English criminal justice system, see Jenny McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to 
Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 519, 528-34. 
7 Prosecutor v. Milosevic (Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt), ICTY Appeals Chamber, IT-02-54-AR73.4 
(21 October 2003) [20]–[22]; Patricia M. Wald, ‘To “Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The 
Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings’ (2001) 42 Harvard Intl L J 535, 
550-52; Langer (n 6) 903-04; Knoops (n 6) 1590. 
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Judges are beginning to introduce similar reforms at the ICC, and more are likely to 
come in the near future.8 In the effort to expedite proceedings, ICC judges have tried to 
restrict certain prosecutorial actions, such as late disclosure, overbroad charging documents, 
and phased investigations, which are seen as contributing to delays.9  Thus chambers have 
tried to direct the timing of prosecutorial investigations and to shape charges brought by 
prosecutors.10 Some pretrial judges have also taken an interventionist approach to disclosure, 
requiring prosecutors to submit in-depth analysis charts explaining the documents 
disclosed11 and demanding that both parties submit to Chambers all the documents 
exchanged during disclosure, to give judges the information necessary to manage the pretrial 
process.  
It remains an open question whether judicial managerialism has also circumscribed 
defense activities. A few defense attorneys have commented on their experiences with 
certain aspects of ICC procedure, such as the confirmation of charges and disclosure.12 But 
no one has examined systematically how judges’ procedural decisions have affected the 
defense at the ICC. Has judicial managerialism limited defense opportunities to present and 
examine witnesses, to review disclosure, or to file interlocutory appeals?13 Have cost 
concerns led to restrictions on defense investigations?14 Have Chambers urged defense 
                                                 
8 Regulation 54 of the ICC Regulations notes the various orders that Trial Chambers can issue to “‘streamline 
trials as far as possible,” “to avoid, as much as possible, long and detailed, and possibly insufficiently 
insubstantiated, indictments with a multitude of alternative or cumulative charges that would have to be 
decided separately in the course of trial,” “to limit the average length of trials as far as possible,” and “to 
prevent, wherever possible, trials from being hijacked by the defendant.”  Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Construction Site 
for More Justice: The International Criminal Court After Two Years’ (2005) 2 Am J Intl L 370, 376. For a 
suggestion that managerialism is likely to grow in importance, see Vasiliev (n 2) 13-14; see also Expert Initiative 
Report (n 4) 8-43. 
9 See, eg, Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘The ICC of the Future’ (2012) 45 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 99, 110-11 
(identifying “phased investigations” and “across the board redactions” of documents as a key source of delay); 
see also WCRO Expediting Proceedings Report (n 4) 8-10 (identifying prosecutorial disclosure and 
investigative activity as sources of delay). 
10 For example, judges have refused to confirm cumulative charges with respect to the actus reus, and they have 
prohibited charges resting on alternative modes of liability for the same crime. 
11 Through these charts, judges have required the prosecution to relate each piece of information disclosed to 
one or more of the elements of crimes charged. See Johan D. van der Vyver, ‘Time Is of the Essence: The In-
Depth Analysis Chart in Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 48 Crim L Bull Art I. In 
Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chamber required the defense to submit an in-depth analysis chart for its evidence, too.  
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Decision on the Disclosure of Evidence by the Defence) Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, ICC-01/05-01/08-31 (5 December 2008) [¶9]–[¶10]. 
12  See, eg, Natacha Fauveau-Ivanovic, ‘Quelle réalité pour les droits de la défense au sein de la Cour pénale 
internationale?’ (2014) 5 Revue des droits de l’homme 2; Karim A A Khan and Caroline Buisman, ‘Sitting on 
Evidence? Systemic Failings in the ICC Disclosure Regime—Time for Reform,’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 1029; Karim A.A. Khan and Anand A. Shah, ‘Defensive 
Practices: Representing Clients Before the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 76 L & Contemporary 
Problems 191. 
13 See Jackson and M’Boge, (n 4) 966 (noting that some ICC defense attorneys have expressed concern about 
judges relying too heavily on written statements rather than oral witness testimony and therefore preventing the 
defense from fully presenting or challenging witness accounts). 
14 Cf Knoops (n 6) 1567 (observing this effect of efficiency measures at the ICTY). 
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attorneys to disclose their case early on15 or to settle any aspects of the case with the 
prosecution16  
To begin an exploration of these questions, I surveyed ICC defense attorneys about 
their views on the Court’s procedures. The survey asked broad questions about the fairness 
and expeditiousness of ICC proceedings, as well as more targeted questions about the use of 
managerial techniques by judges and the effect of these techniques on the defense.  
Responses to the survey showed that, at least at present, defense attorneys do not 
perceive judicial managerialism as an impediment to adequate representation at the ICC. 
While attorneys expressed several concerns about procedural unfairness at the Court, they 
did not believe that judges’ preoccupation with efficiency was the cause for the unfairness. 
Respondents complained about insufficient financial and institutional support for defense 
work, but they tended to place responsibility for these decisions on the Registry and States 
Parties, not on judges.17 Respondents did express concerns about certain judicial decisions 
on disclosure, charging, interlocutory appeals, and victim participation.18 But for the most 
part, defense attorneys did not believe that an emphasis on efficiency drove the results in 
these decisions. Rather, the attorneys thought that judges failed to give sufficient weight to 
defendants’ rights and deferred too much to victims’ interests.  
The chapter analyzes these defense perspectives against the background of scholarly 
commentary and judicial decisions. In most respects, defense attorney views are consistent 
with comments on ICC procedure by outside observers and supported by the Court’s 
record. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to verify the accuracy of each defense 
allegation. But on the whole, defense critiques are in line with external assessments of the 
ICC’s procedures.  
While academic writings on managerial judging have tended to assume that the 
practice undercuts defense rights, survey responses suggest a more complex dynamic at the 
ICC. Respondents opined that certain judicial efforts to expedite proceedings—demanding 
earlier disclosure, filtering out charges more aggressively, and restricting victim 
participation—could favor defense rights.  
It is difficult to predict the precise measures that ICC judges might take to expedite 
proceedings. Judges might limit the defense’s ability to question witnesses, restrict defense 
investigations, and impose heavier disclosure obligations on the defense. But survey 
responses suggest that managerialism need not always harm defense rights. Defense 
attorneys could leverage the court’s emphasis on expeditiousness to advocate for greater 
judicial regulation of prosecutorial activities. 
II. The Rise of Managerial Judging at International Criminal Courts  
                                                 
15 See, eg, Khan and Shah (n 12) 223-24 (arguing that the confirmation hearing and associated disclosure and 
managerial practices have forced defense attorneys to reveal their strategy early on, allowing the prosecution to 
adjust its case for trial and potentially interfering with the presumption of innocence and the defendant’s right 
to remain silent). 
16 Cf Langer (n 6) 875 (noting that this was a feature of managerial judging at the ICTY). 
17 See infra Part III.B.2. 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
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The concept of managerial judging was first used by American scholars to describe 
trends in American civil procedure.19 As Judith Resnik noted in her famous article on the 
topic, in the late 1970s, U.S. judges took on a more activist stance in civil cases and were 
“not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them by litigants, but also […] 
meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case 
preparation.”20 Before too long, scholars in other countries observed similar trends in 
criminal cases.21  
Maximo Langer was the first to apply the term “managerial judging” to describe 
procedural reforms at international criminal courts.22 Langer describes managerial judging as 
a practice under which “the court, with the parties’ assistance, wields [procedure as a device] 
to expedite process.”23  He contrasts managerialism with the more traditional judicial 
demeanor in adversarial and inquisitorial systems: 
Unlike the passive and uninformed court of the adversarial system, the managerial 
court gets information about the case very early in the process in order to actively 
pressure the parties to reach factual and legal agreements and accelerate their pre-trial 
investigations and trial cases. But unlike the court of the inquisitorial system that 
actively investigates the truth, the managerial court is active to make sure that the 
parties do not delay proceedings.24 
Other scholars also observed that judges were using procedural measures to 
streamline proceedings in international criminal cases.25 Although most discussions of this 
trend have focused on the ICTY and ICTR, Vasiliev has noted that managerial judging has 
spilled over into other international criminal courts as well.26 
Judges at the ICTY and ICTR pursued efficiency through a wide range of 
procedures. Status conferences “streamlined the proceedings and armed the Trial Chambers 
with information, enabling them to exercise greater control over their cases.”27 Judges also 
“establish[ed] a work plan that sets forth the parties’ obligations and the dates upon which 
                                                 
19 Robert F. Peckham, ‘The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to 
Disposition’ (1981) 69 California L Rev 770, 770; Judith Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard L Rev 
374, 374-80; William W. Schwarzer, ‘Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role’ (1978) 61 Judicature 
400, 401-02. 
20 Resnik (n 19) 376-77. 
21 See, eg, McEwan (n 6) 522; New Zealand Law Commission, Criminal Pre-Trial Processes: Justice Through Efficiency 
(2005) <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R89/R89.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016; P Johnson 
and MF Latham, ‘Criminal Trial Case Management: Why Bother?’ (2011), 
<http://www.aija.org.au/Criminal%20Justice%20201120 
2011/Papers/Latham&Johnson.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016. For analysis of continued judicial passivity 
in U.S. criminal cases, see Darryl K. Brown, ‘The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication’ (2005) 93 California L Rev 1585, 1632; but cf Nancy J. King and Ronald F. Wright, 
‘The Insivible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations’ 
(2016) 95 Texas L Rev 325. 
22 Langer (n 6) 836. 
23 ibid 836. 
24 ibid. 
25 See, eg, Nancy Amoury Combs, ‘Legitimizing International Criminal Justice: The Importance of Process 
Control’ (2012) 33 Michigan J Intl L 321, 359; Vasiliev (n 2) 10-11; Wald (n 7) 549. 
26 Vasiliev (n 2) 12; see also Fauveau-Ivanovic (n 12) 2, 7. 
27 Combs (n 25) 330; Langer (n 6) 888. 
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they must be met.”28 Critically, judges demanded early and broad disclosure of evidence in 
order to equip the parties and the court with information to resolve the case more swiftly. 
To curb lengthy indictments and lengthy trials, judges also “invite[d] the Prosecutor to 
reduce the number of counts charged and the number of crime sites or incidents comprised 
within the charges.”29 
At trial, judges restricted the number of witnesses called and the time allowed for 
examination and cross-examination.30 Judges also tried to accelerate the process by 
permitting more liberal use of written evidence.31 Throughout the process, they also used 
formal and informal rewards and sanctions to encourage the parties to agree on as many 
issues as possible and even to negotiate the outcome of the case.32 Finally, judges limited the 
opportunity to appeal preliminary issues as a way to move cases along.33 
Commentators have expressed concern about the effect that managerial judging has 
had on the fairness of the trial and the search for truth. Langer has argued that “there is a 
tension between judicial activism to expedite proceedings on the one hand and fairness and 
truth-determination on the other. For instance, this judicial activism may have created 
problems of impartiality, and the use of written statements has probably worsened the truth-
determination ability of ICTY trials.”34 Knoops has asserted that Tribunals’ emphasis on 
efficiency disproportionately burdened the defense and undermined equality of arms.35 
Vasiliev has also observed the potential conflict between managerial judging and defense 
interests: 
[T]he defence may not be forced to cooperate with the managerial court (or 
sanctioned for its failure to do so fully) by admitting facts, by giving up or disclosing 
defences before hearing the prosecution evidence, by reaching agreements on 
evidence (Rule 69), or by not presenting evidence it deems material to its case. In 
general, the defence has no apparent incentives to expedite the process, as opposed 
to delaying it. In most scenarios, it will opt for a ‘contest-everything’ tactic, which 
helps divert the adversary’s resources from the core issues of personal responsibility 
and linkage evidence to the investigation and presentation of crime-base evidence. 36  
Even some ICTY judges have denounced specific managerial practices as 
inconsistent with procedural fairness.37  
A few commentators have acknowledged that, in some cases, “shorter proceedings 
may benefit the defendant”38 and that managerial judging could also cut into prosecutorial 
                                                 
28 Combs (n 25) 330; Langer (n 6) 888. 
29 Vasiliev (n 2) 11. 
30 Combs (n 25) 330; Langer (n 6) 889. 
31 Langer (n 6) 899-900. 
32 ibid 892-93, 898-99. 
33 ibid 901-02. 
34 ibid 908 n 370. 
35 Knoops (n 6) 1580.  
36 Vasiliev (n 2) 18. 
37 Milosevic (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt) (n 7) [20]–[22]; Wald (n 7) 550-52. 
38 Langer (n 6) 908 n 370. 
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independence.39 But as a general matter, managerial judging is seen primarily as a burden on 
the defense.  
In recent years, ICC judges have come under a similar pressure to expedite 
proceedings Efficiency has become a mantra at Assembly of States Parties meetings, and 
judicial and acadmic study groups have discussed measures that the court could take to 
streamline the process.  
ICC judges already have various tools they need to expedite proceedings. They can 
hold status conferences to set filing schedules, discuss questions about disclosure, regulate 
the evidence to be presented, and set time limits on arguments.40 They can encourage the 
parties to settle factual or legal issues and dismiss or recharacterize the charges pursued by 
the prosecutor. They can also restrict the issues on which the parties can obtain interlocutory 
appeals. 
In fact, judges have already begun using some of these tools, particularly at the 
pretrial stage. To streamline proceedings, they have closely regulated disclosure,41 required 
the prosecution (and sometimes the defense) to produce summaries of evidence to be 
disclosed and charts indicating the relationship between each piece of evidence and the 
charges,42 and rejected or reshaped a number of charges.43 Some have even attempted to 
regulate the timing of prosecutorial investigations.44 So far, accounts of judicial 
managerialism have focused on measures that have encumbered the prosecution more than 
the defense. But as the court remains under pressure to expedite proceedings, it is worth 
examining whether and how managerial practices may also have affected the defense.   
 
III. Defense Views on Fairness and Efficiency at the ICC 
A. Survey Method  
At present, we know little about the impact that managerial practices might have on 
defense representation at the ICC. To begin gathering information on this question, I 
conducted an online survey of ICC defense attorneys in May-June 2016. The survey 
consisted of 23 questions, which were estimated to take 10-15 minutes to answer. The 
questions were in English, but French-speaking attorneys were told they could respond in 
                                                 
39 Vasiliev (n 2) 18. 
40 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002 (ICC RPE), ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1, r 121; ICC Regulations 
of the Court 2004, ICC-BD/01-01-04, reg 54. 
41 Alex Whiting, ‘Disclosure Challenges at the International Criminal Court’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 1007, 1027-28.  
42 Van der Vyver (n 11) 48. 
43 War Crimes Research Office, The Confirmation of Charges Process at the International Criminal Court: a Critical 
Assessment and Recommendations for Change (2015) 44 (WCRO Confirmation of Charges Report); Expert Initiative 
(n 4) 82. 
44 Alex Whiting, ‘Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 76 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 163, 167. 
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French.45 To encourage participation, the survey was confidential and did not ask for the 
participants’ names or nationalities.46 No other incentives were provided for participation. 
Based on ICC filings and a research of public records, I identified and emailed 53 
attorneys who had practiced at the ICC to request their participation. The list included 
primary and associate counsel, but also a few duty counsel, ad hoc counsel, one legal 
consultant, and one legal assistant.47 In addition, the Counsel Support Section (CSS) at the 
Registry, which maintains a list of counsel and their email addresses (but could not share 
these with me because of privacy concerns) agreed to send the solicitation on my behalf. 
This solicitation went out to 69 practicing ICC counsel and associate counsel who had 
intervened at the ICC, yielding a few additional responses. In total, 82 attorneys received a 
solicitation either directly from me or from the CSS. Of those 82 attorneys, 18 substantially 
completed the survey,48 which represents a response rate of 22%. Because the sample was 
not random, selection bias may have affected the survey results. This survey should be 
viewed as a preliminary examination of defense views at the ICC and should be 
supplemented by follow-up studies.  
The eighteen survey respondents have diverse legal backgrounds. Twelve have 
practiced in a common-law/ adversarial jurisdiction, five in a civil-law/ inquisitorial 
jurisdiction, and one in a mixed system. Because the survey questions were in English, the 
results somewhat overrepresent English-speaking, common-law attorneys and may not fully 
reflect the distinct perspectives of Francophone and civil-law attorneys.49  
The level of experience among respondents varied as well. All but one had at least 
five years of experience in international criminal law, at the domestic or the international 
level, and eleven had over fifteen years of experience. Five had worked at the ICTY, thirteen 
at the ICTR, and 2-4 at each of the SCSL, ECCC, and the STL.50 Just under half of the 
respondents had practiced international criminal law in different capacities, as prosecutors, 
judges, legal officers, academics, or victim’s representatives. The level of experience at the 
ICC also varied. Most respondents had handled one or two cases at the ICC, but a few had 
handled three or more. A large majority had handled matters at the pretrial stage, a smaller 
majority had done so at trial, and just over a third had handled matters on appeal. Roughly 
91% of respondents had recent experience representing clients at the ICC (from 2014 until 
present), but a majority had also defended ICC cases as early as 2003-11. 
 
B. Survey Findings 
                                                 
45 Solicitation letters to those attorneys included a paragraph in French encouraging responses in French. 
46 Respondents were given the option, at the end of the survey, to provide their name and email to be 
contacted for further information. A few respondents provided their contact information, which has been kept 
confidential. 
47  There were thirteen recipients who fell into that group (ad hoc or duty counsel; legal consultant; or legal 
assistant). 
48 Because respondents were not required to answer each question in order to move forward with the survey, 
some of them occasionally skipped one or more questions. This explains why some questions in the tables 
reproduced here have less than 18 responses. Twenty-three respondents began the survey, but five of them 
completed only a third of the survey, so these responses were not included in the analysis. 
49 Three attorneys responded partially or fully in French.  
50 None had worked at the East Timor Special Panels. 
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1. Judicial Managerialism 
On the whole, respondents did not believe that the ICC had adopted a managerial 
approach to procedure or sacrificed fairness for efficiency. However, a large majority of the 
respondents expressed other concerns about equality of arms and procedural fairness at the 
court. Respondents complained that the court—particularly the Registry, under pressure by 
the States Parties—failed to provide the defense with sufficient resources and institutional 
support to allow for adequate investigation and trial preparation. Respondents also expressed 
concerns about judicial approaches to disclosure, the confirmation of charges, victim 
participation, and interlocutory appeals. 
One of the first substantive survey questions in the survey asked respondents to 
select one or more labels that best describe the procedural system at the ICC. The results are 
reproduced in Table 1 below. Notably, only two respondents chose “managerial/efficiency-
driven” as an appropriate label. Most picked “a mix of adversarial and inquisitorial” as the 
most fitting description. The second most popular label, chosen by more than half of 
respondents, was “victim-oriented.”51 
Table 1. Defense Categorization of ICC Procedural System. 
 
The survey next asked defense attorneys to indicate whether they had experienced 
certain procedural actions that unduly limited defense rights or interests. Specifically, the 
question asked whether the court had taken one of the following measures: 1) unduly 
restricted the defendant’s right to make a statement; 2) unduly limited the defense’s ability to 
investigate; 3) unduly limited the defense’s ability to present defense witnesses; 4) unduly 
limited the defense’s ability to question adverse witnesses; 5) unduly limited the defense’s 
ability to review evidence disclosed by the prosecution; 6) unduly limited the defense’s ability 
to file interlocutory appeals; 7) rejected any of the respondents’ motions as “frivolous” or 
“baseless”; or 8) described defense tactics as “delay tactics”? Respondents were also given 
space and prompted to elaborate on their responses if they so wished. 
                                                 
51 See Table 1. 
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The most common restrictions reported were limits on the ability to investigate 
(55.5%), limits on the ability to adequately review evidence disclosed by the prosecution 
(64.7%), and limits on the ability to file interlocutory appeals (60%).52 Only a minority of 
respondents had experienced the other restrictions listed in the survey. 
Table 2. Defense Experiences of Procedural Restrictions by the Court 
Question Yes  No  Total 
Unduly limited your client's right to make a statement (Please 
explain if you wish.) 
23.53% 4 76.47% 13 17 
Unduly limited your ability to investigate on behalf of your client 
(Please explain if you wish.) 
55.56% 10 44.44% 8 18 
Unduly limited your ability to present defense witnesses (Please 
explain if you wish.) 
28.57% 4 71.43% 10 14 
Unduly limited your ability to question adverse witnesses (Please 
explain if you wish.) 
33.33% 5 66.67% 10 15 
Unduly limited your ability to adequately review evidence 
disclosed by the prosecution (apart from legitimate redactions for 
witness protection) (Please explain if you wish.) 
64.71% 11 35.29% 6 17 
Unduly limited your ability to file an interlocutory appeal (Please 
explain if you wish.) 
60.00% 9 40.00% 6 15 
Rejected a motion as “frivolous” or “baseless”?  (Please explain if 
you wish.) 
40.00% 6 60.00% 9 15 
Described a tactic you have taken in the course of your 
representation as a “delay tactic”?  (Please explain if you wish.) 
35.71% 5 64.29% 9 14 
 
The survey also asked respondents to compare ICC procedures to those at other 
international criminal courts (to the extent that respondents had the relevant experience or 
knowledge). A majority of respondents thought that the ICC imposed the restrictions 
mentioned above more frequently than did other international criminal courts.  At the same 
time, most respondents did not find that this made the ICC process more expeditious. 
Among those who had a basis of comparison, most thought that the pace of ICC 
proceedings was either about the same or slower than that of the ICTY and ICTR.53  
When asked to compare the fairness of ICC procedure to that of other international 
criminal courts, one-third of respondents noted that it was as fair as ICTY procedure. One-
fifth of respondents thought the ICC was less fair than the ICTY; none thought the ICC was 
fairer than the ICTY.54 Judgment was more mixed in comparing ICC and ICTR 
procedures—about 18% thought that the ICC was fairer, while 23.5% thought the ICTR 
was fairer, and another 23.5% thought the two courts were similar in fairness.55 The ICC was 
seen as fairer than the ECCC by those who had a basis for comparison, while views about 
the fairness of the ICC vis-à-vis the STL and SCSL were mixed. 
In response to a question about judicial activism, 64% defense respondents stated 
that ICC judges are as active as they should be. Only one respondent thought judges should 
                                                 
52 See Table 2. 
53 A couple of respondents did, however, believe that ICC proceedings were faster than the STL and SCSL. 
54 Roughly 47% of the respondents said they did not know which court was fairer. 
55 Roughly 35% of respondents said they did not know which court was fairer. 
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be less active, and four respondents believed that judges should be more active, with one 
suggesting that “[t]hey should be better trained to manage proceedings consistent with basic 
fair trial guarantees.”56 The lack of complaint about judicial intervention is particularly 
striking given that close to two-thirds of respondents hail from adversarial systems, where 
judges remain passive in criminal cases.  
As some of the open-ended responses explained, judicial activism could be good or 
bad, depending on how it is used: 
This is not an easy question as each court appears to have different approaches. 
Some are unduly active, while some much less so. . . .  Again, the Confirmation 
Hearings are an odd animal and one may have thought the court would be more 
active—i.e. imaginative and investigative—but it is really a rubber stamp if there is a 
suggestion of adequate evidence being present. Having said that, in the Ruto 
/Kenyatta cases four suspects were not confirmed [sic]. So not a complete waste of 
time.57 
Passivity or activism of the judges depends on the system of the proceeding 
(adversarial-passive or inquisitorial -active). An active judge in an adversarial system 
is not acceptable and vice versa. You have to choose and ICC does not choose! That 
is the problem.58 
No problem if good judges are active, but it really is problematic if bad judges think 
they should actively manage all types of things.59 
Another measure frequently mentioned as a feature of managerialism is an effort by 
judges to encourage the parties to enter into factual stipulations or to negotiate the charges 
or sentence.60 At the ICC, negotiations between the parties are permitted, but they seem to 
have occurred in only one case so far.61 Judges do not appear to have attempted to 
encourage the prosecution and defense to settle cases or stipulate to facts.62 According to 
most respondents, judges have also not demanded overly broad disclosure by the defense—a 
feature of managerialism that is often used to encourage negotiations and expedite the 
proceedings.63  
Finally, most respondents agreed with the proposition that judges should take steps 
to expedite the process at the ICC. A majority (61.5%) of respondents were open to the idea 
                                                 
56 Respondent # 20. 
57 Respondent # 10. 
58 Respondent # 15. 
59 Respondent # 18. 
60 Langer (n 6) 879; McEwan (n 6) 527. 
61 The Court accepted its first admission of guilt in Al Mahdi in 2016, but this remains an exceptional case. 
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, ICC-01/12-01/15-171 (27 September 
2016). 
62 None of the respondents indicated that this was already happening, even though the survey included a 
question whether judges should be promoting such negotiations. In Al Mahdi, no evidence emerged to suggest 
that judges encouraged an admission of guilt or otherwise participated in the negotiations. Alex Whiting, ‘The 
Significance of the ICC’s First Guilty Plea,’ Just Security, 23 August 2016, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/32516/significance-iccs-guilty-plea/. For a discussion of judicial encouragement 
of plea bargaining and factual stipulations to expedite proceedings, see, eg, McEwan (n 6) 525. 
63 Langer (n 6) 897; McEwan (n 6) 523. 
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of judges promoting negotiations between the parties about the sentence or the charges. 
Most were also open to judges taking other measures—such as filtering out unwarranted 
charges at the confirmation stages, issuing judgments more quickly, and ensuring earlier and 
broader disclosure—to speed up proceedings.64 
In short, defense attorneys do not believe that judges have been unduly 
interventionist or have sacrificed defense rights for the sake of efficiency. A review of ICC 
decisions that use the terms “efficiency,” “judicial economy,” and “expeditious” confirms 
that so far, judges have not allowed concerns about expeditiousness to undermine defense 
rights. There appears to be no correlation between the use of one of these terms and a 
decision against the defense.65 Chambers seem to be as likely to find for the defense as they 
are for the prosecution when efficiency, expeditiousness, or judicial economy is mentioned 
as a factor relevant to the decision. Finally, Chambers have largely refrained from using 
certain terms, such as “frivolous” and “delay tactic,” to describe defense actions.66 This is 
also consistent with defense perceptions that judges are not using informal sanctions to prod 
the parties to speed up the process. 
 
2. Defense Investigative Resources 
Although respondents did not believe that judicial management of the proceedings 
has negatively affected defense representation at the ICC, they did complain about the 
underfunding of the defense as a result of cost concerns. 
Like the international criminal tribunals and hybrid courts that preceded it, the ICC 
is in principle committed to ensuring equality of arms between defense and prosecution. 
Like its predecessors, however, it has interpreted equality of arms to mean procedural 
equality, not equality of resources.67 The parties are to be placed in “a procedurally equal 
position to make their case during the whole course of the trial.”68 While international 
criminal procedure does not guarantee equality of resources, the right to a fair trial ensures 
that defendants receive “adequate” time and facilities to prepare a defense.69 Therefore, if the 
                                                 
64 58% said that judges should take other measures to expedite proceedings, while 42% said that judges should 
not do so. 
65 A review of a random sample of 34 ICC procedural decisions that use the terms “efficiency,” “judicial 
economy,” or “expeditious” confirms that so far, judges have not let concerns about efficiency undermine 
defense rights. There appears to be no correlation between the use of one of these terms and a decision against 
the defense. Out of 34 decisions reviewed, a concern for expediting the proceedings was material to the 
outcome of 11 decisions. In 5 of these decisions, a concern for expediting the proceedings (or efficiency or 
judicial economy) favored the defense, in 4 decisions, the same concern favored the prosecution, and in 2 
decisions, it favored both the prosecution and the defense (as against the victim’s representatives). 
66 Judges never used the term “delay tactic” and used “frivolous” quite rarely, roughly 40 times. 
67 See Charles C. Jalloh and Amy DiBella, ‘Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: Continuing 
Challenges’ (2013) in William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (eds) The Ashgate Research 
Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013) 251, 253. 
68 International Bar Association, Fairness at the International Criminal Court 19 fn 9 (2011) (quoting Stefania Negri, 
‘The Principle of “Equality of Arms” and the Evolving Law of International Criminal Procedure’ (2005) 5 Intl 
Crim L Rev 513, 513. 
69 Rome Statute art 67(1)(b). 
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defense is deprived of essential investigative resources or access to evidence, this may render 
the proceedings fundamentally unfair and warrant a stay of the proceedings.70 
Most defense respondents stated that the ICC had at times unduly limited their 
ability to investigate. As a few open-ended responses indicated and an independent review of 
court records confirms, these restrictions were imposed primarily by the Registry and not by 
Chambers.71 A majority of those surveyed further stated (in response to a different question) 
that the court had not provided defense counsel with sufficient resources to represent 
clients.  
Table 3: Has the ICC generally provided you with sufficient resources to adequately represent your 
client? 
 
Open-ended responses elaborated on the types of resource restrictions imposed. 
While only one respondent criticized the level of remuneration for attorneys under the legal 
aid system,72 several complained that the Registry does not allocate sufficient staffing 
resources to meet the demands of complex cases.  
                                                 
70 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, 
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008), Trial Chamber I, ICC-
01/04-01/06 
 (13 June 2008) [77]-[80], [91].  
71 See, eg, Respondent # 10 (“In the Reg 55 proceedings the Registry did not grant permission to investigate -
i.e pay for investigations - until the court itself had decided the issue that would make such investigations 
necessary.  I can’t say the court - i.e. Trial Chamber - limited me.”). It is possible, therefore, that the number of 
attorneys who believe they did not have sufficient resources to investigate may be higher. Some attorneys may 
have answered “no” to the question whether “the Court” limited their ability to investigate because they 
interpreted the term to include only the Chambers. 
72 But see Respondent # 9 (advocating reform of the legal aid system to pay counsel and their assistants better) 
(translated from French). For a public statement criticizing the level of payment, see David Hooper, ‘Response 
to the Discussion Paper “Review of the ICC Legal Aid System’” (2012) 14 <http://www.iccnow.org/ 
documents/8212_D_Hooper_Q_C__response__legal_aid.doc> accessed 28 June 2016. For a discussion of 
remuneration of counsel compared to remuneration of prosecutors, see International Criminal Court, 
Assembly of States Parties, Registry’s Single Policy Document on the Court’s Legal Aid System (Twelth Session, 2013) 
11 < https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-3-ENG.pdf > accessed 4 November 2016 
(discussing reduction of monthly counsel salaries from €10,832 to €8,221, with a possible maximum of €10,687  
to compensate for professional charges; salaries for associate counsel are lower); Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, Legal Representation Team, Comments and Recommendations on the ‘Discussion paper on the Review of 
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To provide context for this criticism, it is worth examining briefly the ICC’s legal aid 
scheme. Before trial and during appeal, legal aid presumptively allocates funds for three 
defense team members: principal counsel, a legal assistant, and a case manager.73 During trial, 
the defense team also receives funds for an additional “associate” counsel.74 The Registry 
may allocate additional staffing resources if the complexity of the case warrants it.75 A few 
respondents complained, however, that the Registry did not always approve funds for the 
staff needed to help with case preparation.76 As one respondent opined, “[I]nflexible, formal 
budgets with fixed sums do never properly reflect the needs of counsel and put them from 
the beginning in a[n] unfair and limited position.”77  
Several defense motions challenging Registry decisions on legal aid highlight the 
concern about staffing needs.78 In Lubanga, Ntaganda, and Katanga, the defense challenged 
staffing allocations made by the Registry at different points in the proceedings. In Lubanga, 
the defendant’s first counsel, Jean Flamme, had to withdraw for health reasons just before 
the case was to be transferred from the Pre-Trial to the Trial Chamber. The replacement 
counsel-to-be, Catherine Mabille, demanded that the Registrar increase staffing on the case 
before she would accept appointment. Although the Registrar eventually largely acquiesced 
to Ms. Mabille’s demands, the dispute delayed the proceedings for months.79  
                                                                                                                                                 
the ICC Legal Aid System’ (2012) 
<http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Legal_Aid_review_comments.pdf>. 
73 Registry’s Single Policy Document (n 72) 10.   
74 ibid 10.   
75 ibid 15.   
76 See Respondent # 10 (“In the Reg 55 proceedings the Registry did not grant permission to investigate -i.e 
pay for investigations - until the court itself had decided the issue that would make such investigations 
necessary.  I can’t say the court - i.e. Trial Chamber - limited me.”); Respondent # 19 (stating that the court 
“first rejected request for mission to question a witness, then rejected request to send full staff there” and 
arguing that “more staff [is] needed”);  Respondent # 23 (complaining that the court “provid[ed] grossly 
inadequate resources to enable me conduct appropriate investigations” and that “[t]he budgetary allocations are 
arbitrary, grossly inadequate and payments and reimbursement of expenses incurred by counsel are either not 
paid or paid after several months going to years, if ever”); Respondent # 6 (complaining of “lack of resources” 
and “administrative red tape”); Respondent # 14 (“Defence teams do not have as many logistical resources at 
various levels. They are not considered ICC staff so they do not receive the same benefits and protections as 
staff. . . . Those on legal aid have to make numerous continuing requests for funding which makes job security 
hard to guarantee.”). But cf Respondent # 10 (“In practice whenever I asked for more (and I concede I was 
careful in my demands given the initial indication of there being little funding) I got it. I don’t think I was 
limited unduly by budget.  But I could have been. In fact, it was almost as if we were designing the legal aid 
system. The scheme the ICC had put in place was wholly misplaced and it had to react to the practicalities that 
we were able to present.”) 
77 Respondent # 22; see also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (Reasons for Review of Registrar's Decision on Defence 
Resources), Trial Chamber VI, ICC-01/04-02/06-389 (29 October 2014) [39]–[41]; Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen 
(Public Redacted Version of “Defence Submissions in Advance of the 23 May 2016 Status Conference”), Trial 
Chamber IX, ICC-02/04-01/15-439-Red2 (18 May 2016) [21]. 
78 The defense can challenge Registry decisions pursuant to Regulation 83(4). 
79 International Bar Association, Monitoring Report: International Criminal Court (2007) 17 
<http://www.ibanet.org/ 




The dispute resurfaced, however, after the Registry cut legal aid for the defense team 
for the period after closing arguments and before final judgment.80 Attorneys argued that the 
cutback violated Lubanga’s fair trial rights because the defense needed to maintain a legal 
team to help with an eventual appeal, should one be needed. The Trial Chamber agreed and 
overruled the Registry’s decision.81 Despite this decision in favor of Lubanga’s defense, the 
same dispute between the Registry and the defense arose again in Katanga after closing 
arguments, and Chambers stepped in once more to restore legal aid.82  
In Ntaganda, counsel challenged the Registry’s refusal to allocate more than six 
months of salary for a second legal assistant to help at trial.83 The Chamber agreed with the 
defense that a second legal assistant should be funded for the duration of the trial. In 
reversing the Registry, the Chamber noted that the decision to deny funding was not 
supported by reasons and was inconsistent with the Registry’s stated legal aid policy.84  
A number of survey respondents also voiced concerns that they did not receive 
sufficient support for field investigations. The Court’s legal aid system sets a budget for 
investigations at €73,006 per team.85 This is estimated to cover a total of about ninety days of 
investigations, including the salary of one professional investigator, one resource person in 
the field, daily allowance for the period, and travel costs of up to €13,000.86 In addition, 
defense teams can be reimbursed for miscellaneous and travel expenses of up to €3,000 per 
month. Miscellaneous expenses include office supplies, translation of documents gathered in 
investigations, and solicitation of preliminary expert advice.87  Counsel may request 
additional resources, and the Registry will evaluate the request on a case-by-case basis, based 
on factors such as the number of charges filed, the number of victims participating in the 
case, and the number of additional witnesses called by the prosecution and the victims’ 
representatives.88  
While the budget scheme allows for funding increases to accommodate the practical 
demands of each case, several respondents noted that, in practice, support for investigations 
                                                 
80 The Registry refused to remunerate members of the legal team other than principal counsel on the case for 
the period after closing arguments and before judgment. Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Decision Reviewing the Registry’s 
Decision on Legal Assistance for Mr. Lubanga), Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06-2800 (30 August 2011) 
[13]. 
81 Lubanga (n 80) [63]. 
82 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui (Transcript of Oral Order), Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-341-ENG (18 
June 2012) [19]–[24]. 
83 After one counsel stepped down and a new counsel was appointed after the confirmation of charges, the new 
counsel, Stephane Bourgon, requested funds for a second legal assistant (which had previously been provided 
during the confirmation of stages proceedings). The Registry authorized funds for a second legal assistant for 
only a 6-month period. Defense counsel argued that the limited pay period would prevent the defense from 
hiring highly qualified assistants and that, in any event, given the complexity of the case and the extensive 
preparation necessary for trial, the defense would need a second legal assistant for more than a six-month 
period. Ntaganda (n 77) [13]–[17]. 
84 Ntaganda (n 77) [43]. 
85 Registry’s Single Policy Document (n 72) 11. 
86 ibid 11. 
87 ibid 25. Once an expert is approved and requested to give testimony by the Chamber, the expert’s fees and 
expenses are covered by a separate fund for the Victims and Witnesses Unit. Id. 
88 ibid 11; Regulations of the Court (n 40) reg 83(3). 
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has been insufficient.89 Again, these limitations were imposed by the Registry, not the judges. 
A few respondents also faulted the Registry for not approving certain investigative 
missions.90 In some cases, even when the Registry did eventually approve requests for 
additional investigation funds, the unpredictability of the funding frustrated the defense.91  
These concerns have been echoed in public comments by defense attorneys. 
Reacting to a 23% cut in the defense budget for 2015, for example, defense attorney Nick 
Kaufman publicly criticized the inadequate funding of defense investigations. He complained 
that while the prosecution can plan its investigative activities in advance, “[t]he defence . . . 
has to request permission from the Registry for every procedural step. This is a wholly 
unacceptable state of affairs ….”92 He elaborated that: 
The institutionalised prejudice towards the defence exists and is ignored. By way of 
example, apart from the cost of a flight ticket and a basic living allowance, defence 
investigations are never funded in advance and mission expenses are reimbursed with 
a delay of several months. As a result, defence lawyers are forced to fund missions - 
including witness expenses, food and accommodation - out of their own pocket. Just 
recently, I had to advance a loan of 1000 euros to my own legal assistant in order to 
prevent him from exceeding his overdraft while on mission in Ghana. 93   
Finally, Kaufman expressed his concern that “the underlying trend is a progressive 
cut in defence salaries and defence investigative resources.” 94  
Other attorneys have also gone on record to protest insufficient funding for defense 
investigations.95 Defense attorneys have noted that ICC funding falls below that provided by 
the ICTY and ICTR, even though ICC investigations tend to require greater financial and 
                                                 
89 Respondent # 19 (“first rejected request for mission to question a witness, then rejected request to send full 
staff there. . . . ”); Respondent # 23 (“This has been done by providing grossly inadequate resources to enable 
me conduct appropriate investigations.”). 
90 See, eg, Respondent # 10 (“In the Reg 55 proceedings the Registry did not grant permission to investigate -
i.e pay for investigations - until the court itself had decided the issue that would make such investigations 
necessary.  I can’t say the court - i.e. Trial Chamber - limited me.”); Respondent # 19 (stating that the court 
“first rejected request for mission to question a witness, then rejected request to send full staff there” and 
arguing that “more staff [is] needed”);  Respondent # 23 (complaining that the court “provid[ed] grossly 
inadequate resources to enable me conduct appropriate investigations” and that “[t]he budgetary allocations are 
arbitrary, grossly inadequate and payments and reimbursement of expenses incurred by counsel are either not 
paid or paid after several months going to years, if ever”). 
91 See Respondent # 10 (“In practice whenever I asked for more (and I concede I was careful in my demands 
given the initial indication of there being little funding) I got it. I don’t think I was limited unduly by budget.  
But I could have been. In fact, it was almost as if we were designing the legal aid system. The scheme the ICC 
had put in place was wholly misplaced and it had to react to the practicalities that we were able to present.”); cf 
Respondent # 14 (“Defence teams do not have as many logistical resources at various levels. . . . Those on legal 
aid have to make numerous continuing requests for funding which makes job security hard to guarantee.”). 
92 Sophie van Leeuwen, ‘“Totally Unacceptable”: ICC Defence Counsel Budget Cuts Criticised’ (Justice Hub, 15 
December 2014) <https://justicehub.org/article/totally-unacceptable-icc-defence-counsel-budget-cuts-
criticised> accessed 27 June 2016. 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid. 
95 Hooper (n 72) 13-17; ICC Office of Public Counsel for the Defence, Internal Memorandum from Xavier-





logistical support.96 For example, because of a prohibition on witness proofing at the ICC 
(which did not exist at the ICTY or ICTR), defense counsel have to interview any potential 
witnesses in the field.97 Furthermore, ICC counsel, “unlike its counterparts at the ad hoc and 
hybrid courts and tribunals, will not have the benefit of a large and experienced defense bar 
with extensive and broad substantive knowledge of the conflict in question and practical 
advice on planning and conducting investigations on the ground.”98 Defense attorneys must 
“build [their] defense team from the ground up in every respect [and t]he learning curve will 
be a steep one….”99 For those reasons, ICC attorneys have argued that they need 
administrative and financial support even more than attorneys at the ad hoc international 
tribunals did.100  
It is important to note that, in a few cases, such as those concerning high-powered 
Kenyan officials, defendants were able to afford private counsel and bankroll thorough 
defense investigations. As one respondent noted, “[t]he Defence in the Kenya Cases has 
been privately funded. The success of the Defence in Kenya shows that of course budget 
matters!” Furthermore, the Kenyan government not only did not stand in the way of defense 
activity, but likely facilitated it.101 The position of the Kenya defense teams, however, is 
relatively unique at this point in the court’s work. Most ICC defense attorneys have not been 
able to count on either extensive resources or the unconditional support of domestic 
authorities.  
Academic commentary echoes survey responses about the challenges of defense 
investigations. Scholars have discussed the special difficulties that international criminal 
defense attorneys face in obtaining access to the field or evidence from state authorities.102 
Because the defense is not an official organ of the court, it cannot benefit from established 
channels of mutual cooperation in criminal matters.103 More generally, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and domestic authorities have not been as 
accommodating of defense requests for evidence as they have been of prosecution 
requests.104 While the “prosecutor is assumed to have the power and support of the state 
community” in enforcing international criminal law, the defense is seen as an outsider or 
                                                 
96 Hooper (n 72) 13-17; Keïta (n 95) 7-8. 
97 See Hooper (n 72) 13-17; Keïta (n 95) 7. 
98 Khan and Shah (n 13) 225.  
99 ibid 226. 
100 ibid. 
101 See, eg, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, ICC Kenya Probe ‘Hampered by Intimidation,’ 12 January 
2012,  <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-kenya-probe-hampered-intimidation> accessed 4 November 2016.  
102 Caroline Buisman, ‘The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and 
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?’ 27 Leiden J Intl L 205, 212-15; Jacob Katz Cogan, 
‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects,’ (2002) 27 Yale J Intl L 111, 131; 
Fauveau-Ivanovic (n 12) 2, 12; Maria Igorevna Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal 
Proceedings (Volume 55, School of Human Rights Research Series 2012) 190, 205-09 ; Jalloh & DiBella (n 67) 
264; Michael A. Newton, ‘Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defense Bar’ (2011) 47 
Stanford J Intl L 379, 388-90. 
103 IBA, Fairness at the ICC (n 68) 32.  
104 See Respondent # 7 (“Lack of security, distance, lack of government cooperation make defence 
investigations and presentation of defence case extremely problematic, much more than at any other court”); 
Newton (n 102) 390 (noting that national authorities ‘have established detailed mechanisms for providing that 
information to the prosecution teams, but have often been far less forthcoming to defense investigators’). 
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even a pariah.105 The underfunding of defense investigations exacerbates these structural 
barriers to defense investigations.  
Survey responses, as well as the court’s own records, suggest that to the extent that 
resources for the defense are limited, this is largely the result of administrative, rather than 
judicial decisions. The Registry is under pressure from states parties to keep the legal aid 
budget under control,106 so it has taken decisions that, in defense attorneys’ views, have at 
times interfered with the defense’s ability to effectively prepare cases. Judges have often 
supported the defense in its efforts to maintain the staff and resources necessary for 
adequate representation of defendants throughout the proceedings.107 This may explain why 
survey comments about the inadequacy of investigative resources focused on the Registry 
and States Parties, rather than on Chambers.  
 
3. Prosecutorial Disclosure 
Recognizing the investigative challenges that the defense faces in international 
criminal cases, the drafters of the Rome Statute charged the prosecution with investigating 
objectively.108 Prosecutors are supposed to seek out “incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally” “in order to establish the truth.”109 This feature of ICC procedure is 
influenced by the inquisitorial model, under which prosecutors (or, in some countries, 
investigative judges) are seen as neutral officials charged with investigating all evidence 
objectively in the interests of justice. In that model, the defense has traditionally assumed a 
more passive role at the investigative stage and has focused primarily on reviewing evidence 
gathered by the prosecution.110 
Yet defense attorneys have expressed skepticism that the ICC prosecutor is in a good 
position to investigate on the defense’s behalf.111 As Caroline Buisman, an ICC scholar and 
defense counsel, writes, “it is perhaps over-idealistic to expect a prosecutor to search 
purposefully for information that is contrary to his or her perception of the facts and his or 
her case.”112 Moreover, since “the Prosecutor does not, as a rule, question the accused or 
otherwise have his or her account of events, it is questionable whether she can have a 
                                                 
105 Fedorova (n 102) 227, 444. 
106 Review of ICC Legal Aid System (n 72) 1. 
107 International Bar Association, Counsel Matters at the International Criminal Court (2012) 25; see also supra text 
and accompanying notes 80-84.  
108 Rome Statute (n 16) art 54(1)(a) (“In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in 
doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”); see also Jalloh & DiBella (n 67) 277; 
Fedorova (n 102) 445-46. 
109 Rome Statute (n 16) art 54(1)(a). 
110 See, eg, Sonja B Starr, ‘Ensuring Defense Counsel Competence at International Criminal Tribunals,’ (2009) 
14 UCLA J. Intl L & Foreign Affairs 169, 184-85; Jenia I Turner, ‘Plea Bargaining and Disclosure in Germany 
and the United States: Comparative Lessons,’ (2016) 57 William & Mary L Rev 1549, 1559. 
111 Buisman (n 102); see also Hooper (n 72) 13; Respondent # 15 (“[La CPI] pretend confier au Procureur le 
soin de travailler a decharge ce qu'il s'abstient bien .... Soit on donne les moyens a la defense de faire un vrai 
travail de contre-enquete (en l'absence de juge d'instruction et de police, cela serait logique), soit on se retrouve 
dans une situation inequitable vis a vis de la defense (ce qui est le cas)). 
112 Buisman (n 102) 224. 
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realistic basis for such an enquiry.”113 Indeed, studies of investigations in inquisitorial systems 
and at the ICC have found that state authorities are not adequately investigating exculpatory 
evidence.114  
ICC prosecutors are further required to disclose promptly to the defense any 
exculpatory evidence that they have in their possession. Chambers have held that 
prosecutors must disclose “the bulk” and in some cases, “the totality” of exculpatory 
evidence before the confirmation of charges hearing.115 In any event, all exculpatory evidence 
must be disclosed “as soon as practicable.” 116  
The ICC has affirmed that disclosure of exculpatory evidence and evidence material 
to the defense is critical to ensuring a fair trial.117 The proceedings against Thomas Lubanga 
were twice stayed to remedy disclosure failures by the prosecution.118 The Lubanga Trial 
Chamber concluded that it could not ensure a fair trial until the evidence was disclosed at 
least to the court for evaluation of its exculpatory nature.119  
Because disclosure is so central to ensuring a procedural balance between the parties, 
it has been the subject of multiple disputes at the court.120 Not surprisingly, survey responses 
highlighted disclosure as the area of greatest discontent. Almost two-thirds of respondents 
stated that the court has unduly limited their ability to review disclosed evidence. In response 
to a subsequent question, 62.5% of respondents stated that the court had not demanded 
adequate disclosure from the prosecution, while another 18.75% thought that the court had 
only “sometimes” demanded adequate disclosure.  
Several different concerns about disclosure emerged from the open-ended responses. 
First, respondents opined that the court did not do enough to ensure that the prosecution 
disclosed evidence in a timely fashion. They complained of “late disclosure” and the “need 
to file numerous if not endless disclosure requests.”121 In the same vein, a respondent 
reported that “[t]he OTP served thousands of pages of evidence 14 days before the 
Preliminary Hearing as an attempt to prevent the Defence from conducting full analysis of 
their case.”122 The same respondent noted that “[t]he Court permitted a timetable favourable 
                                                 
113 ibid 224. 
114 ibid 211-219; Jacqueline Hodgson, ‘The Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer in an Inquisitorial Procedure: 
Legal and Ethical Constraints,’ (2006) 9 Legal Ethics 125, 135-36, 136 n 48. 
115 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Time Table, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 2006 ¶¶[124]-[133]. 
116 Prosecutor v. Ruto et al, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, ICC-
01/09-01/11-44, Pre-Trial Chamber II (06 April 2011)¶[6].  
117 Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Appeals Chamber (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled “Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related 
Matters”), Appeals Chamber, ICC-02/04-01/15-251 (17 June 2015) ¶ [40] (“The Appeals Chamber has 
previously held that “the disclosure process is essential in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings and that the 
rights of the defence are respected, in particular the principle of equality of arms””) (citations omitted). 
118 Joyce Aluoch, ‘Ten Years of Trial Proceedings at the International Criminal Court,’ (2013) 12 Wash U 
Global Stud L Rev 433, 441.  
119 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Chamber (Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo), ICC-01/04-01/06 
(July 2, 2008) [¶ 30]. 
120 Whiting, ‘Dynamic Investigative Practice’ (n 45) 166; Khan & Buisman (n 12) 1029. 
121 Respondent # 6; see also Respondent # 10 (“Perhaps disclosure of the trial material should take place 
sooner - at present, e.g. in [], the trial witnesses were largely different to the Confirmation witnesses.”). 
122 Respondent # 21. 
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to the OTP. The date of possession of the evidence showed it could have been served 
sooner.”123  
Respondents further complained that the court did not consistently sanction 
prosecutors for disclosure violations.124 Khan and Buisman have expressed similar concerns 
in their public writings—that prosecutors frequently disclose additional evidence after the 
deadlines imposed by Chambers and that Chambers tend to excuse the delay.125 Another 
disclosure-related problem identified by survey respondents was that it is difficult to “get the 
Court to request states to disclose material”—a complaint that echoes those made by 
attorneys at the ad hoc tribunals.126  
Particularly because it is combined with insufficient staffing and investigation 
resources for the defense, late disclosure has reportedly frustrated defense efforts to prepare 
adequately for confirmation hearings and trials.127 One respondent explained that his or her 
defense team was able to review the disclosed evidence adequately only because the 
Chambers delayed first the confirmation hearing and then the trial proceedings.128 This 
criticism echoes a complaint by defense attorneys at the ICTY: that by stretching out 
disclosure of evidence over time, the prosecution “puts the defence off-balance and makes it 
impossible to ‘develop and stick to a proper defence plan.’”129 Independent observers of the 
court concur that “the disclosure process is often rife with delays and the subject of 
considerable and time-consuming litigation, which can further prolong the proceedings.”130   
 Another concern of respondents was that the court authorized disproportionate and 
unnecessary redactions of disclosed documents. At the ICC, the prosecution can seek 
permission to redact information that would identify witnesses, their families, or others who 
might be placed at risk on account of the court’s work.131 Disclosure may also be restricted 
to protect the integrity of ongoing investigations, national security information, or 
confidentiality agreements authorized under the Statute.132 While redactions and summaries 
                                                 
123 Respondent # 21. 
124 Respondent # 23 (“The court most of the time accommodates the Prosecutor’s unreasonable disclosure 
violations. The Prosecutor has hardly ever been sanctioned except in very limited cases for its disclosure 
violations.”); Respondent # 14 (“The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is not as robustly enforced and it is 
usually up to the defence to demonstrate the need.”); 
125 Khan and Buisman (n 12) 1033-34. 
126 Respondent # 10; cf Newton (n 102) 388-90, 417-27. 
127 See, e.g., Respondent # 19 (“did not provide us with necessary software to read prosecution evidence and 
failed to oblige the prosecution to present evidence in a different more accessible format”); Respondent # 
21(“The OTP served thousands of pages of evidence 14 days before the Preliminary Hearing as an attempt to 
prevent the Defence from conducting full analysis of their case.”); see also Respondent # 14 (“The proceedings 
are victim oriented and Defence Counsel are not afforded enough time to conduct their own investigations and 
adequately review prosecution disclosures.”). 
128 Respondent #10. 
129 Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, ‘Defending the Defenders: The Role of Defence Counsel in International 
Criminal Trials’ (2010) 8 J Intl Crim Just 463, 479 (quoting Stephane Bourgon, ‘Procedural Problems Hindering 
Expeditious and Fair Justice’ (2004) 2 J Intl Crim Just 526, 529). 
130 Expert Initiative (n 4) 103. 
131 Rome Statute (n 69) art 68(5); ICC RPE (n 41) rr 81(3),(4). 
132 ICC RPE (n 41) rr 81(2)-(4), 82. 
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of witness statements are permitted before confirmation to address such concerns, witness 
identities must ultimately be disclosed before trial.133 
Defense attorneys believed that judges were overly deferential to the prosecution in 
authorizing redactions. As one respondent explained: 
Witness protective measures have a deleterious effect on disclosure - the Court 
inevitably? [sic] accepts what the prosecutor tells it as to the risks to its witnesses 
when in fact there is little or no risk at all.   The Court is also unduly protective of 
intermediaries and of the sums provided to witnesses and intermediaries. There 
should be fuller disclosure of that.   
In public comments, too, some defense attorneys have criticized the redactions 
process as “reflexive,” “unwieldy[,] and unmanageable.”134  
Outside observers have likewise noted that the redactions process is time-consuming 
and unpredictable. Chambers have adopted different approaches to authorizing initial 
redactions and lifting redactions later in the process.135 As a result, “[t]he same evidence may 
be disclosed to the Defence multiple times with different degrees of redactions. Effectively, 
the Defence may be required to review the same material three times before the actual 
identity of the witness or other key information may be disclosed to the Defence and allows 
for full Defence investigations to take place at a very late stage in proceedings.”136 This 
process heavily taxes the already thinly stretched staffing resources of the defense. 
Survey responses were not conclusive as to the reason for the judges’ perceived 
failure to ensure prompt and comprehensive disclosure. No respondents suggested that the 
problem resulted from an excessive focus on efficiency. Instead, some opined that judges 
gave undue deference to prosecutorial claims of exigency, whether in terms of the timing of 
disclosure or in terms of the necessary redactions.137 Academic commentary is divided on 
this question. Whiting has argued that disclosure delays are the inevitable product of 
prosecuting complex international crimes involving mountains of documentary evidence and 
multitudes of vulnerable witnesses needing protection.138 Others have claimed that delays are 
fueled by inconsistent judicial approaches to disclosure.139 What is clear is that neither 
                                                 
133 ICC RPE (n 41) r 81(5). 
134 Khan and Shah (n 13) 208; see also ibid 209 (“The above-mentioned reflexive, if not cavalier, attitude 
toward redactions by the ICC prosecution, and the wide scope and imposition of redactions at the ICC—
beyond merely witnesses and their families—has resulted in a bureaucratic, overbroad, and resource-draining 
redaction regime. At its worst, such a regime risks resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and 
otherwise greatly hinders the work of the defense.”). 
135 Expert Initiative (n 4) 113-115. 
136 ibid 115. 
137 One respondent connected the disclosure problems to the ICC’s “victim oriented” proceedings. 
Respondent # 14. Another noted that “the court accepts what the prosecutor tells it as to the risks to its 
witnesses when in fact there is little or no risk at all.” Respondent # 10. 
138 Whiting, ‘Dynamic Investigative Practice’ (n 45) 179-82. 
139 Expert Initiative (n 4) 103 (“Disputes as to the scope, adequacy, and timing of disclosure are frequent, and 
can be exacerbated by ambiguities in the law and a lack of clarity and predictability in the Court’s practice.”); 
see also IBA, Fairness at the International Court (n 68) 24 (“The prosecution has repeatedly sought an AC decision 
to clarify the disparate approaches to disclosure to prevent continued uncertainty and to facilitate more 




defense attorneys nor outside observers believe that the source of the disclosure problems is 
managerial judging. In fact, managerial judging is seen as a possible remedy for late and 
incomplete disclosure.140 
 
4. Confirmation of Charges 
The survey did not directly ask defense attorneys to comment on the confirmation of 
charges process, but several respondents nonetheless raised the issue when asked about top 
procedural reforms they would like to see implemented at the ICC. The confirmation of 
charges is an adversarial proceeding on the basis of which the Pre-Trial Chamber decides 
whether “substantial grounds” exist to believe that the person committed the crimes 
charged. The hearing is supposed to protect “against wrongful prosecution and ensur[e] 
judicial economy by allowing to distinguish between cases that should go to trial from those 
that should not.”141 Although the process is supposed to safeguard against unwarranted 
accusations, several defense attorneys criticized it as unfair and inefficient, at least as 
practiced at present. Views on how the confirmation process should be reformed differed 
widely among defense attorneys, however, just as they do among other observers of the 
court.  
Some attorneys argued that the confirmation process should be strengthened and 
that judges should be more rigorous in sifting out unwarranted charges.142 As one 
respondent explained: 
The threshold for the confirmation of charges is so low. This allows charges which 
should have been filtered and dismissed to be confirmed for trial. Due to the 
reluctance of Pre-trial Judges to grant leave for appeal of most confirmation 
decisions, the cases are sent for trial on very deficient and defective charges. The 
ICC Judges should be more active and rigorous during the confirmation process and 
during trial.143 
 Another respondent lamented the variable and unpredictable approaches to 
confirmation by different judges.144 He or she also criticized judges for refashioning charges 
                                                 
140 See, eg, WCRO Expediting Proceedings Report (n 4) 61 (“Late disclosure of material by the Prosecution to 
the Defense has been one of the principal causes of delay at the ICC.”); Whiting, ‘Disclosure Challenges at the 
ICC’ (n 42) 1007 (“Commentators echo the complaints of the defense and judges, deplore the prosecution’s 
repeated failures to meet its disclosure obligations, and urge reforms.”). 
141 Prosecutor v. Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo), Pre-Trial Chamber II, , ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 June 2009); 
Triestino Mariniello, ‘Questioning the Standard of Proof: The Purpose of the ICC Confirmation of Charges 
Procedure’ (2015) 13 J Intl Crim Just 579, 583; Nerlich, ‘The Confirmation of Charges Procedure at the 
International Criminal Court: Advance or Failure?’ (2012) 10 J Intl Crim Just 1339, 1354  (noting that the 
confirmation of charges hearing was designed at least in part to serve as a check on the prosecutor and to filter 
out cases in which charges are not sufficiently supported by the evidence). 
142 See, eg, Respondent # 21 (proposing greater judicial control over the Prosecutor as a needed procedural 
reform); Respondent # 23 (arguing that ICC should “streamline the Pre-trial proceedings and raise the 
threshold bar for confirmation of charges.”) 
143 Respondent # 23. 
144 Respondent # 16 (“At this time, charging instruments vary from case to case and this provides insufficient 
notice of charges to the defendants which is in violation of rights.”). 
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at trial through Regulation 55, which allows trial judges to recharacterize the charges 
confirmed by pre-trial judges.145 The respondent opined that this practice renders the 
confirmation process meaningless and leaves defendants without adequate notice about the 
charges they face.146  
While some respondents argued for a higher standard of proof at confirmation, 
others thought that the confirmation of charges procedure should be abolished altogether.147 
One person suggested that introducing an investigative judge into the ICC system would 
offer the best solution to some of the investigative and confirmation difficulties: 
[The top three procedural reforms:] abolish the confirmation hearing; abolish the 
bifurcated (even tri-furcated) trials; creation of an investigative judge. I have long 
been in favour of the adversarial model for ICL, but the problems with 
investigations at the ICC are huge, witnesses are bribed, influenced from practically 
all sides. I am not confident the parties can address this and at trial it is too late (cp. 
Kenya case). An investigative judge, in some form, can bring in the deeply needed 
supervision of the investigations.148 
Another respondent suggested that involving the defense earlier in the process 
would help the accused prepare to dispute unsubstantiated charges more effectively. This 
respondent believed that if ad hoc counsel were assigned as soon as a new situation is 
opened, counsel could “build up the nucleus of the Defence… case. If then a Case opens in 
a Situation, the ad hoc counsel will have to hand over their case files to the newly appointed 
counsel for the defence . . . .” 149 As the respondent elaborated, such early appointment could 
help secure equality of arms:  
The key disadvantage between OTP and Defence is up to now, that OTP has a 
continuity in working on a case for years before a case started. Defence Counsel 
started normally at ‘zero’ at the beginning of a case. Assignment of ad hoc counsel 
and handing over of files under a fixed protocol could balance these structural 
differences.150  
                                                 
145 Regulations of the Court (n 40) reg 55 (providing that in its final judgment, the “Chamber may change the 
legal characterization of facts to accord with the crimes […] or to accord with the form of participation of the 
accused […] without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to 
the charges.”). 
146 Respondent # 16 (“In addition, the proliferation of the use of Regulation 55 to notice additional modes of 
liability and other charges even prior to trial has rendered the process of CoC nearly meaningless (i.e. modes of 
liability litigated and not found as ‘charged’ modes of liability in the CoC process are later noticed via 
Regulation 55”). 
147 Respondent # 18 (stating that the “confirmation hearing can be abolished, serves absolutely no purpose”). 
148 Respondent # 18. 
149 Respondent # 22. This view has been expressed by some defense attorneys in public comments as well. See 
J. Dieckmann & C. Kerll, ‘Representing the “General Interests of the Defence”: Boon or Bane? – A 
Stocktaking of the System of ad hoc Counsel at the ICC’, Intl Crim L Rev 11 (2011) 105, 134-35. 
150 Respondent # 22. The same respondent also argued that defense teams should be larger during the pre-trial 
stage—the Registry should appoint two, rather than just one counsel before confirmation. This would help 
even the field between the prosecution and the defense and ensure a fair trial. ibid. The OPCD could 
theoretically fulfill these tasks of preparing the case for the defense before the first appearance of the accused. 
But because the OPCD’s staff is so small, in practice, it does not have the capacity to do so. 
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Outside commentators echo defense attorneys’ concerns about the inefficiency and 
unpredictability of the confirmation process. Although the confirmation process was 
originally envisaged by some as a means of expediting proceedings,151 it is now widely 
believed to have extended and encumbered trial preparation.152 It has taken the court on 
average almost one year to reach a confirmation decision after the initial appearance of the 
accused.153 Likewise, trials have begun, on average, more than a year and a half after a 
confirmation decision has been handed down, suggesting that the pre-confirmation process 
has not effectively narrowed the issues and expedited the proceedings.154 A number of 
commentators have concluded that the confirmation process is too costly and time-
consuming,155 and some have called for its abolition.156 
The other concern expressed by respondents—about inconsistent approaches to 
confirmation—is also widely shared. Scholars have commented on the disagreements among 
judges about the purpose of the confirmation hearing, the standard of proof, the timing and 
scope of pre-confirmation disclosure, and the division of responsibilities between Pre-Trial 
and Trial Chambers.157  
                                                 
151 See, eg, Prosecutor v. Bemba (Decision on the Evidence Disclosure System and Setting a Timetable for 
Disclosure Between the Parties), Pre-Trial Chamber III, ICC-01/05-01/08-55 (31 July  2008) [15], [19]; Gilbert 
Bitti, ‘Two Bones of Contention Between Civil Law and Common Law: The Record of Proceedings and the 
Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum’ in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress, and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International 
and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (Berlin Verlag 2001) 277; Kai 
Ambos and Dennis Miller, ‘Structure and Function of the Confirmation Procedure Before the ICC from a 
Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 7 Intl Crim L Rev 335, 348. 
152 See, eg, Friman (n 4) 921, 930; Nerlich (n 141) 1354; Expert Initiative (n 4) 93-95; WCRO Confirmation of 
Charges Report (n 44) 85-86. 
153 See, eg, Ignaz Stegmiller, ‘Confirmation of Charges, in The Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 905; Expert 
Initiative (n 4) at 93. 
154 Stegmiller (n 153) 905-06; Expert Initiative (n 4) 93. For an analysis of the reasons why confirmation 
hearings have not entirely fulfilled their purpose in this respect, see Expert Initiative (n 4) 83-84; WCRO 
Confirmation of Charges Report (n 44) 85-86. On the other hand, it is worth noting that at the ICTY, as of 
2009, the pre-trial stage (from the date the defendant comes into the tribunal’s custody to the date of the 
opening trial arguments or of the first plea hearing) lasted on average 1.9 years, and at the ICTR—3.6 years. 
Jean Galbraith, ‘The Pace of International Criminal Justice,’ (2009) 31 Mich J Intl L 79, 117. A study conducted 
in 2011 found that the median length of the pretrial phase (measured as the number of days between the initial 
appearance and either (1) the first day of trial, (2) the date a plea was entered, or (3) the date that some other 
conclusion of the pretrial period was reached) was eighteen months. See Maximo Langer and Joseph W. 
Doherty, ‘Managerial Judging Goes International but its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical 
Assessment of the ICTY Reforms’ (2011) 36 Yale J Intl L 241, 252. The ICC pretrial process therefore appears 
to be slower than that of the ICTY, but faster than the process at the ICTR. 
155 Nerlich (n 141) 1354; Stegmiller (n 153) 906. 
156 Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (OUP 2012) 343; Schabas, International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute 735 (OUP 2010); Expert Initiative (n 4) 93-95, 100. 
157 See, eg, Mariniello (n 141) 580. For example, some Pre-Trial Chambers have required the prosecution to be 
“trial ready” at confirmation and have demanded a relatively high standard of proof to confirm charges. See, eg, 
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges”), Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-
01/10 OA4 (30 May 2012), [44]; see also Prosecutor v. Muthaura & Kenyatta (Decision Requesting Observations 
on the “Prosecution’s Request to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(9) of the Statute,”), ICC-01/09-02/11 (29 January 2013) [9]; Prosecutor v. Gbagbo (Decision adjourning 
the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute), ICC-02/11-
01/11 (3 June 2013) [25]; Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges), Pre-Trial Chamber, 
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While there is broad consensus that Chambers employ inconsistent standards at 
confirmation and that the process is too lengthy, defense attorneys and other commentators 
tend to disagree on the question whether judges have been sufficiently rigorous in filtering 
out charges. Whereas defense attorneys believe that judges are not sufficiently rigorous, 
other observers have concluded that the Pre-Trial Chambers have generally succeeded in 
disposing of unsupported charges at confirmation.158 In support of the latter view, 
commentators point out that as of May 2014, Chambers had confirmed charges against 
twelve suspects and declined to confirm charges against four suspects.159 In two of the 
twelve cases in which charges were ultimately confirmed, the Prosecutor had to reconsider 
the initial charges filed or conduct further investigations, after judges suggested that they 
would not confirm the charges as originally filed.160  Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chambers have 
reduced the temporal and territorial scope of charges in a number of cases.161 
Observers have offered diverging interpretations of these figures. Some have argued 
that the 25% declination rate reflects judges’ rigorous review of the evidence and is a mark 
of success.162 Yet others, including some survey respondents, have focused instead on the 
court’s failure to dispose of other arguably unmeritorious cases at confirmation163—the 
Ngudjolo case, which resulted in an acquittal; the cases against Ruto and Sang, which were 
terminated by the Trial Chamber for insufficient evidence;164 and the cases against Kenyatta 
and Muthaura, which were ultimately withdrawn by the Prosecutor for lack of evidence.165 
These observers believe that the court should be even stricter in its review of prosecutorial 
charging decisions.  
How one interprets these figures depends on one’s view of the Kenyan cases, which 
represent four of the five cases where charges were terminated or withdrawn after 
confirmation. The Prosecutor has claimed that bribery and intimidation led witnesses in 
these cases to recant or refuse cooperating with the prosecution, which resulted in the 
ultimate termination or withdrawal of charges.166  By contrast, a number of defense attorneys 
believe that the prosecution failed to investigate and present to the court credible evidence 
that the defendants were responsible for the crimes charged. In the end, whether or not one 
agrees with defense views on the effectiveness of the filtering mechanism at confirmation, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
ICC-01/04-01/06-803 (29 January 2007) [37]–[39] (requiring “compelling” evidence and “concrete and tangible 
proof”); Mariniello (n 141) 595-96; Stegmiller (n 153) 897 (arguing that “the wording of ‘concrete and tangible 
proof’ suggests that the test is rather high”). Others have been less demanding and have held that once the 
“substantial grounds to believe” threshold is met, the credibility of the evidence is to be determined at trial. 
Mariniello (n 141) 589. 
158 Expert Initiative (n 4) 81; Nerlich (n 141) 1347-48. 
159 Expert Initiative (n 4) 80. 
160 ibid 80-81. 
161 ibid 88. 
162 ibid 85. 
163 See, eg, Respondent # 23; see also Expert Initiative (n 4) 85.  
164 Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang (Public Redacted Version of: Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of 
Acquittal), Trial Chamber V(A), ICC-01/09-01/11 (5 April 2016) ¶ [131] (reasons of Judge Fremr); ¶ [135] 
(reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji). 
165 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Office of the 
Prosecutor, ICC-01/09-02/11-983 (5 December 2014); Khan & Shah (n 12) 218-19; Respondent # 10. 
166 See, eg, Ruto & Sang ¶¶ [140]-[150] (reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji) (noting that witness interference 
“impede[s] a neutral appreciation” of the prosecution’s case). 
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is important to take them into account as the court considers whether and how to 
restructure this key stage of the proceedings. 
 
5. Interlocutory Appeals 
Another procedure that defense attorneys identified as needing reform concerns 
interlocutory appeals. Article 82(1)(d) of the Rome Statute provides that a party may appeal a 
“decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious 
conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the 
Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially 
advance the proceedings.”167 In order to file an interlocutory appeal, a party must first obtain 
permission from the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber that issued the impugned decision.  
Overall, respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the way the interlocutory appeal 
mechanism has operated at the ICC. A majority opined that Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers 
grant leave to file an interlocutory appeal too sparingly. As one attorney complained: 
The ICC procedure requires leave to appeal to be granted before an 
interlocutory appeal can be filed. All applications for leave to appeal were 
rejected. It did not matter whether the leave sought related to a fundamental 
fair trial violation as right of notice or significant defects in the form of the 
indictment.168 
Several respondents therefore suggested reforms to the interlocutory appeal process. 
One suggested that parties should not need to request permission to appeal confirmation 
decisions.169 Others thought that the Appeals Chamber should decide whether to grant leave 
to appeal on interlocutory matters.170 More broadly, respondents thought the court should 
grant authorization to appeal preliminary matters more frequently.171 
A quick review of defense motions for leave to appeal shows that judges are in fact 
quite parsimonious when it comes to permitting interlocutory appeals. Out of 458 issues on 
which the defense sought leave to appeal, Chambers granted leave for only 51 issues, 
yielding an average grant rate of 11.13%.172 By contrast, Chambers granted leave to the 
prosecution’s request much more frequently. Out of 90 issues for which the prosecution 
requested leave to appeal, Chambers granted leave on 34 issues, yielding an average grant 
                                                 
167 Rome Statute (n 69) art 82(1)(d).  
168 Respondent # 23; see also Respondent # 18 (“I think the leave to appeal, if necessary at all, should be 
decided by the A Ch. denying leave by the same TC or PTC will be easily experienced as unduly limiting 
appeal”); Respondent # 21 (“The Defence filed for leave to appeal against the Preliminary Hearing Decision 
and the Judge who had decided the issue also decided the leave to appeal which she rejected.”). 
169 Respondent # 14. 
170 Respondents ## 18, 21. 
171 Respondents ## 7, 18, 23. 
172 The grant rate differed widely from cases to case, so the experience of individual defense attorneys is likely 
to differ as well. For example, in Lubanga, the defense sought leave to appeal a total of 55 issues, but judges 
granted the leave to appeal as to only 15 issues (yielding a grant rate of 27%). In Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted leave to appeal on only one out of seven issues raised by the defense 
(yielding a grant rate of 14%, closer to the average). 
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rate of 37.78%.173 The prosecution therefore succeeds in reaching the Appeals Chamber for 
interlocutory appeals almost three and half times more often than does the defense.  
One cannot tell, simply based on these figures, whether the requests for leave to 
appeal by the prosecution and by the defense are equally meritorious. The defense filed 
almost 2.5 times more requests for interlocutory appeals than the prosecution; in those 
requests, defense attorneys raised on average 5 times more issues than did prosecutors.174 It 
is therefore possible that a greater percentage of defense motions failed to meet the criteria 
for interlocutory appeals.  
On the other hand, precisely because the defense tends to file more motions for 
interlocutory appeals, to the extent that the regime is not functioning properly, it affects the 
defense more frequently than the prosecution. Furthermore, a number of the issues on 
which leave to appeal is denied, such as the confirmation of charges or the recharacterization 
of charges, affect the accused directly and significantly.175 Defense attorneys’ concern about 
the low rate of success of requests for interlocutory appeal is therefore understandable.  
Because Chambers grant leave for interlocutory appeals so rarely, a number of 
inconsistent decisions by Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers remain in place, reducing the 
predictability of ICC procedures. For that reason, it is not only defense attorneys, but also 
outside observers who have argued that leave to appeal should be granted more generously 
and that a separate chamber responsible for granting leave to appeal should be created.176  
Respondents did not speculate what might drive the frequent rejections of requests 
for interlocutory appeals. Judges may not like having their procedural decisions reviewed on 
appeal, or they may simply believe that the defense is not raising meritorious issues. Judges 
may also be concerned that interlocutory appeals take up too much time. Scholars studying 
the ad hoc tribunals have argued that judges restricted interlocutory appeals there as a means 
                                                 
173 Again, as with defense requests, the success of prosecution requests varies significantly from case to case. In 
Lubanga, Chambers granted 62.5% of the prosecution’s requests for leave to appeal. 
174 The defense filed 133 requests to file interlocutory appeal, while the prosecution filed 55 requests. 
175 Stegmiller (n 153) 895 (noting that leave to appeal was denied with respect to all confirmation decisions, 
except in Mbarushimana, where the prosecution was granted leave to appeal the declination of charges); Prosecutor 
v. Bemba (Public Redacted Version of “Decision on ‘Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the 
Temporary Suspension of the Proceedings Pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court and 
Related Procedural Deadlines’” of 11 January 2013), Trial Chamber III, CC-01/05-01/08-2487-Red (16 January 
2013) [33], [35]–[36] (denying defense request to appeal the recharacterization of charges). 
176 WCRO Expediting Proceedings Report (n 4) 52 (citing Christopher Staker, ‘Article 82: Appeal against 
decision of acquittal or conviction or against sentence’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Nomos 1999) 1029, 1031; Expert Initiative (n 4) 
163 (“It would therefore seem to be a wise course of action to establish a mechanism whereby issues of a 
sensitive (procedural or substantive) nature that are arguably affecting a trial decision should be capable of 
interlocutory appeal where a failure to address that matter at an early stage could negatively affect the position 
of a party, the fairness of proceedings or their integrity.”); see also ibid 164 (“[The separate Trial Chamber] 
could be composed of the Presiding Judges of the Trial Chambers, which would have the benefit of ensuring 
consistency of approach between Trial Chambers. It would also ensure that one member of the Trial Chamber 
that rendered the impugned decision would participate so as to ensure that full consideration be given to both 
the effect of a possible appeal on trial proceedings and the effect of resolving the matter thereupon.”). 
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of expediting proceedings.177 This may therefore be one area in which ICC judges, too, are 
limiting defense representation to promote efficiency.178  
 
6. Victim Participation 
Defense attorneys also expressed concerns about victim participation in ICC 
proceedings. In a departure from its predecessor international criminal courts, the ICC 
allows extensive victim participation at pretrial and trial. This novel procedural framework 
reflects a reorientation away from a purely retributive model of justice toward a more 
restorative one.179  
Acting through legal representatives, victims can take part at both pre-trial and trial, 
although most modes of participation require judicial permission. Victims can attend 
confirmation hearings and have been permitted to express their views and concerns at the 
hearing through their legal representative.180 Victims’ legal representatives have also been 
allowed to question defense witnesses at confirmation hearings, as long as victims’ personal 
interests would be affected by the testimony.181 At trial, victims have been permitted to make 
oral and written submissions, question witnesses, present and challenge evidence, and be 
heard as witnesses.182 If the accused is convicted, victims can also take part in the reparations 
proceedings.183   
In part because the crimes adjudicated by the ICC have so many victims, the process 
of determining who qualifies as a victim participant has proven difficult, lengthy, and 
costly.184 Victim applications must be reviewed by the Registry, Chambers, and the parties, 
and identifying information must often be redacted.185 The process of redacting and 
reviewing the applications has consumed extensive resources. 
                                                 
177 See, eg, Langer (n 6) 901 (“Finally, two additional reforms that also have gone in the direction of the 
managerial judging system are the elimination of a distinction between the guilt-determination and sentencing 
phases and the limitation of interlocutory appeals.”); Langer & Doherty (n 6) 250 (noting that UN experts and 
ICTY judges attempted to narrow the availability of interlocutory appeals at the ICTY “on the theory that 
fewer interlocutory appeals would mean shorter pretrial and trial proceedings”). 
178 As some have argued, however, the limitation on interlocutory appeals may not be a particularly efficient 
managerial technique. In many cases, interlocutory appeals may advance efficiency over the long term, as they 
clarify the law and reduce disputes between the parties on certain issues. Moreover, in some cases, an 
interlocutory appeal may be less costly than a post-conviction appeal, particularly where the issue appealed 
significantly affected the fairness of the proceeding and the remedy after conviction is likely to be much more 
costly than a correction before or during trial. 
179 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Victim Participation Revisited—What the ICC Is Learning About Itself’ in Carsten Stahn 
(ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 1133, 1134-36. 
180 Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of 
an ICC Trial Judge’ (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve J Intl L 475, 485. 
181 Van den Wyngaert (n 180) 485. 
182 Van den Wyngaert (n 180) 486; Vasiliev, ‘Victim Participation Revisited’ (n 179) 1133, 1164. 
183 Rome Statute (n 69) art 75(2). 
184 Van den Wyngaert (n 180) 481-82; Vasiliev, ‘Victim Participation Revisited’ (n 179) 1147-63. 
185 Van den Wyngaert (n 180) 481-82. 
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Commentators have criticized both the application process and the participation 
scheme for victims as inefficient, cumbersome and costly.186 They have also argued that 
victim participation interferes with the accused’s right to a fair trial, for two principal 
reasons: 1) it taxes the already limited resources of defense counsel by requiring counsel to 
expend time to review victim applications and respond to victim submissions; and 2) it 
violates equality of arms by pitting the defense against multiple accusers.187 At this point, 
critiques of victim participation are so widespread that, as one commentator concluded, 
“alarmed accounts outweigh by far the more positive and hopeful ones.”188 
It is therefore not surprising to find that a number of defense attorneys are also 
concerned about the practice. Roughly 27% of respondents stated that victim participation at 
the ICC violates the rights of the accused, and another 20% believe that it does so “in some 
respects.” In open-ended responses, attorneys explained that the ICC has not managed 
victim participation properly and that victim participation exacerbates the imbalance 
between prosecutorial and defense resources: 
[M]y experience . . . is that it is a waste of time to have victims participating directly. 
Their contribution in the trial is slight - they merely echo the prosecution - and the 
resources spent on them would be better employed on the defence.  Come 
reparations their role obviously increases.   The whole victim issue is a mess in my 
view—and in the view of many of the judges.189 
Victims’ intervention has been poorly managed. Victims counsel have often 
misconstrued their role as independent participants in the trial process to protect the 
rights of victims who deserve to have a voice in the determination of crimes 
perpetrated against them. Victims may be witnesses for the prosecution as well. That 
does not make victim counsel associates of the Prosecution in the trial proceedings. 
Unfortunately victim counsel, and partisan NGO and Special interests purporting to 
act on behalf victims have often tainted the trial proceedings with the advancement 
of their activist agenda, making fair trial hard to attain.190 
It has nearly reached a level of a third ‘party’ rather than expressing only views and 
concerns ‘where the personal interests of the victims are affected’ pursuant to Article 
68(3). Meaningful participation has been lost to blanket participation.191  
Other respondents also complained that the court does not adequately test evidence 
of victim status or other allegations by victim participants:  
The representation for victims prevent[s] the case proceeding as a normal trial. In 
effect there are 2 prosecution counsel. The Judges can take into account victims’ 
wishes based upon no supporting evidence.192 
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Non disclosure of  details to verify if victims are authentic. No proper review of 
veracity of victim accounts and no action or prosecution has been undertaken against 
false claims. Use of intermediary organizations continues unsupervised.193 
In a subsequent question, asking respondents to state “the top three procedural 
reforms that the International Criminal Court ought to institute,” three respondents 
suggested that the ICC should limit victim participation—for example, by not allowing 
victims to take part in the pre-confirmation stage or by limiting their participation to the 
reparation stage.194 Victim participation therefore appears to be an important reform priority 
among defense attorneys, just as it is among ICC commentators and judges. 
 
7. Institutional Support for the Defense 
Respondents also expressed the view that the defense needs better institutional 
support at the ICC, though they disagreed on the form that this support should take. At 
present, counsel are supported by two different organs of the ICC—the Counsel Support 
Section (CSS) and the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense (OPCD). The CSS 
maintains the list of counsel, administers the legal aid scheme, and helps counsel with 
technical and logistical issues.195 The OPCD provides legal research and advice to defense 
teams, stands in as duty counsel for defendants at their initial appearance, and represents the 
defense internally and externally.196 Although both sections operate formally under the 
auspices of the Registry, the Regulations of the Court provide for the independence of the 
OPCD, but not the CSS.197  
At first blush, the institutional structure of the ICC appears generous and fully 
capable of advancing defense interests. In practice, a different picture emerges. While the 
OPCD is independent, its small staff and its exclusion from certain decision-making groups 
within the court prevent it from fully representing defense interests at the ICC.198 
Furthermore, under a reform project launched by the ICC Registrar, the CSS and OPCD are 
soon to be merged into one Defense Office that will be part of the Registry, with a reduced 
staff and without independence from the Registry.199 To address concerns about the lack of 
independence of the new Defense Office, counsel recently created a self-governing 
Association of Defense Counsel. However, this Association is not an organ of the ICC and 
may not be fully effective in advocating for defense positions in key ICC decision-making 
mechanisms.  
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In light of the significant restructuring of defense support mechanisms within the 
court, the survey asked counsel whether they believe that the ICC should reform the 
structure or the mandate of the CSS or the OPCD. A majority of respondents supported 
some type of reform, but their views differed widely on the shape that reform should take. A 
number of respondents expressed general satisfaction with the work of the OPCD (some 
also included the CSS),200 but many argued that the defense needs a stronger office that is 
entirely independent from the Registrar.  
A few thought that the proposed independent bar association for ICC defense 
attorneys is a good step in that direction: 
We desperately need an independent ICC Bar Association for all Counsel who are 
practising under the ICC Code of Professional Conduct., which will be now founded 
end of June 2016. This ICCBA shall (and will finally) replace the OPCD as well as 
OPCV which will not be necessary any longer. In no national system we have 
comparable Offices since we have competent and experienced Bar Associations. CSS 
as a service unit will always be necessary in a way or another.201 
But others were more skeptical that the Bar Association was the proper solution,202 
and they called instead for an independent defense section—perhaps a reformed OPCD—
within the ICC itself.203 As one opined:  
Preliminary discussions of a Defence Organ should occur as this will be the only true 
way to fully achieve structural equality of arms and respect the Defence as a party to 
the proceedings. If such possibility is totally foreclosed at this time, the mandate of 
the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence should be strengthened to allow it to 
better serve both the Court and the Defence teams in its capacity as an independent 
office. The Counsel Support Section should receive any resources it needs to fully 
perform core duties to provide legal aid and resources to not only the Defence, but 
also the Victims (LRVs), Governments’ counsel, witness’ counsel and other 
independent counsel before the Court.204  
More broadly, in discussing ideas for procedural reform, a few respondents opined 
that the court should consult the defense more regularly on procedural and institutional 
questions.205 This sentiment was echoed in public comments by defense attorneys on the 
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Registry’s decision to reduce legal aid payments, which was made after minimal consultation 
and opportunity for comment by the defense.206   
Respondents’ view that the ICC should create an independent defense organ within 
the Court has found support among outside observers of the Court. Fedorova has argued 
that establishing an independent defense organ at the ICC would help “to eradicate any 
perception of inequality and to secure the rights of the defence more broadly.”207 Likewise, 
the Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the ICC has called on states to “consider 
creating an independent Defence Office as a separate organ of the Court with its own Head 
and with a mandate similar in kind and nature to the mandate of the Defence Office before 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.”208 
If the defense is a formal ICC organ, it can address cooperation requests directly to 
states, improving the odds of such requests being honored.209 At present, the defense must 
always request judicial assistance to obtain cooperation from domestic authorities.210 As the 
Assembly of States Parties has recognized, “It is burdensome for the defence to approach 
Chambers for a Court order each time they need a particular piece of information, and in 
most cases Chambers would request that the defence first approach the authorities in 
question. This leads to very slow turn-around time for this type of cooperation….”211 For all 
these reasons, the International Bar Association has also advocated for the establishment of 
an independent defense office, which “would reflect, at an institutional level, the principle of 
equality arms. . . . It would allow the defence office to justify its own budget and would 
significantly ameliorate many of the difficulties that the defence counsel currently face, 
including obtaining state cooperation.”212 
 
8. Procedural Consistency 
Another theme that emerged in the survey responses was a desire for greater 
consistency in judicial decisionmaking at the ICC. For example, when the survey asked 
respondents about top three procedural reforms that the ICC ought to institute, a few 
identified consistency as a priority. As one person opined, the Court should “choose a 
procedural system and stick to it.”213 The same person further stated that proceedings should 
be defined “in the ICC text not in the jurisprudence.”214 The desire for greater predictability 
was shared by another respondent as well: “[I would propose] Consistency of trial 
procedure. While there is certain direction to address this in the Chambers Practice Manual, 
trial procedure can still benefit from more consistency from Chamber to Chamber and be 
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solidified in the Rules or Regulations.”215 Other comments likewise lamented inconsistent 
rules with respect to procedures such as the confirmation and recharacterization of 
charges.216 
The inconsistent procedural rulings of ICC Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are widely 
acknowledged. While some scholars have celebrated this diversity of approaches, others have 
criticized it as unfair and inefficient. 217 Like the defense respondents cited here, the latter 
have argued that Chambers should adopt practice manuals on important procedural issues 
like discovery and that the Appeals Chamber should intervene more regularly to resolve 
inconsistent judgments on procedural matters.218  
 
IV. The Future of Managerial Judging and Procedural Fairness at the ICC  
Efficiency has become a common refrain at ICC Assembly of States Parties 
meetings, and the court itself is actively discussing ways in which it can streamline 
proceedings. Yet in survey responses, defense attorneys note that, for the most part, judges 
have not elevated efficiency above other values in the criminal process. For example, judges 
have not unduly limited defendants’ rights to make a statement, to present witnesses, or to 
question adverse witnesses. They have not used informal sanctions, such as dismissing 
defense motions as “frivolous” or “delay tactics,” to expedite the process. Nor have they 
pressured the parties to negotiate cases or the defense to disclose its strategy early in the 
case. To the extent that a focus on efficiency has affected defense representation, this has 
been primarily the result of administrative and funding decisions made by the Registry and 
States Parties, not by judges.219  
While defense attorneys do not believe that judicial managerialism at the ICC is 
threatening defense rights, they express concern about other procedural decisions. In the 
defense’s view, judges have not done enough to filter out unsubstantiated charges, ensure 
prompt and comprehensive disclosure, permit interlocutory appeals, or limit victim 
participation. More broadly, defense attorneys believe that the court could do more to 
provide equality of arms between the parties. Similar critiques have been made by academic 
commentators and even ICC judges and are therefore not idiosyncratic or overly partisan 
views held only by the defense.  
To address some of the problems identified by defense attorneys, such as the need 
for more generous support for defense investigations, the court would need to invest 
additional resources. Given the emphasis on cost-cutting at the ASP and the underfunding 
of other ICC divisions, including the prosecution and victim support sections, it is unlikely 
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that the court would significantly increase legal aid in the near future. As respondents 
asserted, however, the court could take other measures that help promote equality of arms 
between the parties while not consuming additional resources. In fact, many of the measures 
proposed by defense attorneys—filtering out weak charges more aggressively, ordering 
earlier and broader disclosure by the prosecution, and limiting victim participation—can be 
pursued consistently with an emphasis on efficiency.  
Consider first the idea that judges could do more to manage the confirmation 
process and filter out unsubstantiated charges. A number of commentators have put forth 
similar proposals to promote efficiency at the ICC. For example, two recent expert reports 
on expediting ICC proceedings advocated that Chambers should “more actively seek to 
control and regulate the process of confirmation.”220 One of these reports also called on the 
prosecutor to “put in place a stricter and more critical reviewing process.”221 To allow for 
more effective judicial review of the charges, commentators have also urged the prosecution 
to develop a classification system for investigative paperwork.222 Some judges and scholars 
have further opined that, to facilitate the review process and streamline proceedings, the 
prosecution should conclude investigations before the confirmation stage.223 If managerial 
judging takes this direction with respect to the confirmation process, it would place a heavier 
burden on the prosecution and benefit the defense.224  
Of course, reform of the confirmation process in the name of efficiency could take 
other shapes, which would not advance equality of arms. For example, the Court could limit 
the presentation of witnesses at confirmation and encourage the parties to rely more heavily 
on written evidence and summaries of evidence.225 This would restrict the defense’s ability to 
challenge the prosecution evidence and to contest the charges during confirmation. It would 
also delay disclosure of most evidence until after confirmation, leaving defense teams even 
less time to respond to it.  
Another reform suggested by defense attorneys—reform of the disclosure process—
could also help advance equality of arms while simultaneously enhancing efficiency. Broad 
prosecutorial disclosure can help to offset the limited investigative resources of the defense 
and ensure the fairness of the proceedings. It can also minimize disclosure disputes and 
failures, which have led to enormous delays at the ICC. Commentators have argued that, to 
expedite proceedings, judges must push for earlier and broader disclosure and adopt uniform 
standards with respect to disclosure and redactions.226  Some have also argued that Chambers 
should require the prosecution to identify how each piece of disclosed evidence relates to the 
charges. This would, in their view, “expedite proceedings and [] prepare properly for the 
confirmation hearing,” but also “ensure that the defence [is] prepared under satisfactory 
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conditions.”227 Likewise, some experts have urged prosecutors to apply a liberal approach to 
disclosure and adopt a presumption of disclosing all documents, unless a good reason for 
withholding exists.228  
How successfully the idea of liberal disclosure can be implemented at the ICC, 
however, remains an open question. A main source of disclosure delay has been the 
difficulty of ensuring witness protection, which remains a vexing problem.229 In light of these 
challenges, an efficiency-oriented judge may choose to postpone ordering disclosure that is 
not strictly related to the confirmation of charges until after the confirmation hearing, so as 
to avoid the delays associated with redactions and other forms of witness protection.230 It is 
therefore possible to envision a managerial judge streamlining disclosure in a way that 
undercuts equality of arms. At this point, however, most commentators tend to agree with 
the defense that more liberal disclosure at the ICC is both feasible and likely to expedite 
proceedings.231 
Another area of concern to the defense is the broad interpretation of victim 
participation in ICC proceedings. Many defense attorneys dislike the current model of victim 
participation because it requires the defense to respond to multiple opponents at the same 
time and drains defense resources. Many also believe that victim participation has become 
too unwieldy and interferes with the right to an expeditious trial, and this is a concern shared 
by outside commentators and ICC judges. Here again, the proposals for limiting victim 
participation in the proceedings—for example, streamlining the victim application process, 
restricting the modes of victim participation, or more drastically, limiting victims’ 
involvement to just the reparations stage—may help bring the process closer to procedural 
parity between the defense and the prosecution, while also expediting the proceedings and 
reducing costs. 
In brief, should judges take measures to expedite proceedings at the ICC, a number 
of these measures could benefit the defense. Contrary to standard scholarly predictions, at 
least some forms of managerial justice could be reconciled with equality of arms. As the 
push for efficiency unfolds, we are likely to see the prosecutor and the defense each 
advocating for judges to manage the proceedings in a fashion that does not impinge on their 
respective rights and interests.232 While standard theory predicts that the defense has the 
most to lose from a managerial approach to judging, the early experience of the ICC suggests 
that the picture is not so straightforward. Managerial judging, if coupled with a concern for 
equality of arms, can limit prosecutorial activity and aid the defense, while also ensuring an 
efficient process.  
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